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Issues of equality among members of different cultures in multicultural societies 
have for a long time been the object of philosophical discussions. Several 
perspectives stress the importance of rights for cultural protection, but no 
agreement has been reached on the identification of the holders of these rights. If 
on the one hand liberals appeal to the legitimacy of cultural rights for individuals, 
on the other hand communitarian perspectives focus n the primary role played by 
groups in the articulation of culture. Communitarian theories therefore support the 
attribution of rights for cultural groups, although until now no exhaustive 
approach seems to establish the need of rights for groups. Hence, a deep gap in 
the understanding and the establishment of rights for the protection of culture 
crosses the literature and consequently contributes th  perpetuation of radical 
inequalities in opportunities that exist between memb rs of minority and majority 
cultures. 
The aim of this thesis is to fill this gap by establishing the legitimate role 
of individuals and groups in questions concerning cultural disparities in 
multicultural societies. In the first two chapters, various arguments will support 
the establishment of individual rights of cultural membership, by stressing the 
need of intending cultural membership as a primary good.1 The third chapter will 
deal with the notion of capabilities, which aims to legitimise the role of cultural 
groups in issues over justice in multicultural societies.2 Through an original 
account that attributes capabilities to cultural groups, conceived as entities 
dependent on their members, the danger of attributing rights to collectives is 
avoided. In addition, the concept of capability is al o introduced as the most 
appropriate criterion for the acknowledgement of a disadvantage peculiar to 
cultural minorities’ members in multicultural contex s. The theory of capabilities 
                                                
1 The notion of primary good has been extracted by John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (revised ed., 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, The Belknap press of Harvard University Press, 1971) pp. 54, 78-81. 
2 The current account of capabilities represents an evolution of Martha Nussbaum’s theory of 
capabilities, as exposed in Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2000) and Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice (Cambridge, Mass., 





that will be addressed in this thesis aims to correct the deficit in opportunities at 
the foundation of the unequal political and institutional balance between minority 
































A Focus on the Analytical Standpoints 
 
Before engaging the main arguments that will be proposed in defence of cultural 
rights for groups’ members and of capabilities for groups, the current debate on 
the topic of the protection of culture will be analysed. This examination aims to 
understand and contrast (when necessary) several positions held by both the 
communitarian and the liberal thoughts. In addition, by underlining the 
perspectives that will guide the logic of the main rguments further analysed, the 
two viewpoints of justice as recognition and as universality will be examined, in 
opposition with the notion of cultural assimilation. The role of freedom of choice 
will be evaluated in the conclusion of the chapter, where the role of the individual 
will be stressed as primary in issue of cultural recognition. The structure of this 
chapter is therefore conceived under the lenses of these standpoints, which will 
support the legitimacy of the claims further proposed. 
 
1.1. Justice as Recognition. 
Questions of social justice have, for a long time, focused on an equal distributive 
pattern of resources and opportunities. Among recent theories of just distribution 
of goods, the most famous is John Rawls’s theory of ‘justice as fairness’, which 
shapes just institutions through the application of two principles of justice.3 These 
principles are intended by Rawls to be the result of a rational agreement among 
social members, who put aside preferences and differenc s for the sake of equal 
distribution of opportunities. Justice as distributon, therefore, aspires to give each 
social member a fair amount of goods and opportunities aimed at the free 
achievement of individual ends. The challenge that theories of justice as 
recognition levies at theories of distributive justice argues that accounts of 
distribution focus primarily on the effects, rather than the causes, of an unfair 
distribution of material resources.  
This criticism has been acknowledged both by Iris M. Young and Michel 
                                                





Walzer, among others, in their analysis of domination. Although Walzer examines 
issues of justice through a distributive perspectiv, his analysis of monopolies and 
dominance represents an excellent starting point to understand the danger of 
concentrating the possession of a particular good in the hands of one individual or 
group, by excluding its access to other social components.4 In proposing a theory 
that intends each social good (and its corresponding sphere of acquisition) as 
separate from other goods, Walzer draws attention to those problems brought 
forward by an unequal distribution of resources, as well as to the conditions that 
cause it, such as unbalanced powers.  
It is on the focus on a new perspective that includes questions of equal 
possession of material goods and issues of power throug  social relations that 
Young builds her theory of justice as social recognitio . Young agrees with 
Walzer’s analysis of the background conditions of distributive injustice. However, 
instead of focusing on issues of distribution, she ifts the point of view to 
features concerning ‘nonmaterial social goods such as rights, opportunity, power, 
and self-respect’.5 These are the fundamental elements to take into acc unt in a 
discourse over social justice, though they still require to be further distributed. In 
particular, she refers to unequal distribution of power and decision-making 
processes in institutional contexts, which even if are nonmaterial aspects of 
human life, they nevertheless constitute fundamental components of social 
inequalities.6 By criticizing the individualistic tendency of separating individuals 
from the social and cultural environment in which they grow and live (therefore 
from the power relationships they build), Young affirms that recognition of these 
aspects should instead be included in evaluating theories of social justice.  
According to Young, recognition implies taking into account the existence 
and the social relevance of power relations between cultural groups, which she 
defines as ‘an expression of social relations’.7 The main contribution of Young’s 
                                                
4 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1985), pp. 10-13.  
5 Iris M. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton 
University Press, 1990), p. 16. 
6 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, p. 22. 





account of recognition is its focus on the establishment of recognition of social 
forces as the tool against assimilation of cultures and for the guarantee of the 
liberty of choice. Assimilation would threaten the basic universal rights to express 
one’s individuality and to be worthy of respect. Affirming equality in a context of 
acculturation implies achieving equality through the cancellation of the 
differences that exist among individuals. Therefore, liberty of choice does not 
include any form of acculturation, either voluntary or involuntary.8 The act of 
assimilation to another culture always results in extremely high costs for the 
individual, who has to modify some constituent parts of himself to receive the 
same respect and opportunities that are secured by the members of the majority.9 
It is worth noticing that the notion of culture appears among the categories 
taken into account by Young as aspects that need to be approached through 
recognition rather than distribution.10 Non-recognition of cultural differences 
leads to a form of inequality in society that is impossible to translate to the 
language of distribution, because it refers to the ne d of re-institutionalisation of 
the society under directions other than the redistribution of goods.11 Unjust 
distribution of resources could represent a significant obstacle for the achievement 
of social justice. However, Young’s central point argues that the main cause of 
injustice of distribution is represented by injustice in social institutions, which in 
turn is implemented by the misguiding juxtaposition of the two separate notions of 
cultural members and cultural groups, leading to a failure of their recognition. In 
order to correct unequal opportunities due to cultura  differences, Young invokes 
the conceptualization of specific policies of difference which, instead of blurring 
cultural diversities, encourages them.12  
                                                
8 The notion of assimilation has been the object of a debate around Iris M. Young and Brian Barry. 
If one the one hand Young argues against any form of assimilation, Barry differentiates between 
three different types and affirms that assimilation is admissible when voluntary. For reference on 
the positions of the authors, see Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, pp. 158-163 and 
Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2001), pp. 74-75.   
9 A more specific discussion on the topic of the costs involved in changing one’s identity will be 
endorsed in the Chapter II. 
10 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, p. 15.  
11 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, p. 21.  
12 At this regard, Young introduces the solution of ‘politics of difference’, which focus on 





A slightly different approach to Young’s on issues of justice is carried on 
by Nancy Fraser, who points out that recognition ought not be considered the only 
method to use against social inequality. By differentiating between ‘culture-based’ 
and ‘political-economy-based’ groups,13 Fraser affirms that Young fails to narrow 
the attention solely to the latter of these forms, because, in doing so, she 
underestimates the issues that create political-economic inequalities.14 This is the 
reason why Fraser proposes a ‘critical theory of recognition’, which applies a 
different solution to each situation by distinctly assessing the sources of 
inequalities.15 Hence, although recognition represents one of the elements 
involved in the debate over social justice, any complete theory on this topic 
should acknowledge both the elements of recognition and distribution and 
appropriately use them when necessary.  
In light of the preceding discussion, it is clear that the tendency assumed 
by theories of justice in narrowing the debate exclusively to distributive issues 
needs revision.16 The standpoint of justice as recognition will be th guideline of 
the following analyses, which will look at fairness in context of multicultural 
states through an examination of cultural rights and capabilities.  
 
1.2. The Universalistic Perspective. 
Only by departing from a universalistic point of view, can it be argued that all 
societies are voluntarily or involuntarily composed of a series of cultural groups. 
These groups constitute the majority as well as one or several minorities living in 
the territory of a state. In light of this premise, it follows that the majority culture 
should be viewed as a cultural group itself. In fact, it symbolises a set of values 
and beliefs, and a context of choice that constitute a point of reference for its 
                                                                                                                           
person’s position in the social context. For furthe reference on this topic, see Young, Justice and 
the Politics of Difference, chapter 6, pp. 156-183.  
13 Nancy Fraser, ‘Recognition or Redistribution? A Critical Reading of Iris Young’s Justice and 
the Politics of Difference’, The Journal of Political Philosophy: Vol. 3, No. 2, (1995), pp. 172-
173. 
14 Fraser, ‘Recognition or Redistribution?, pp. 169-170.  
15 Fraser, ‘Recognition or Redistribution?’, p. 167 and pp. 179-180. 
16 David Schlosberg, ‘The Justice of Environmental Justice: Reconciling Equity, Recognition, and 
Participation in a Political Movement’, in Andrew Light and Avner deShalit, eds., Moral and 





members. Both minority and majority cultures are to be conceived as cultural 
groups, in which individuals share their beliefs and chieve common goals. 
In many circumstances, members of minorities face a situation of 
disadvantage that goes against the principle of equal treatment. This situation 
represents the scenario taken into account in the following analyses, which aim at 
the reparation of this disadvantage through individual rights of cultural 
membership and capabilities for cultural groups. Cultural rights for members of 
cultural minorities should be considered as rights aimed at correcting those 
inequalities in issues that relate to basic rights t at exist with regard to the 
majority.17 These basic rights refer, for example, to the right that people have in 
living in the cultural context they choose, the right of freely building their identity 
in relation to those principles and beliefs they value, and the right to achieve those 
goods considered intrinsically valuable for their lives.18 Thus, two necessary 
conditions are required for the reparation of the underlined disadvantages. First, 
people should be free to choose whether to enjoy these rights in the context either 
of the minority or of the majority culture. Second, they should not be threatened in 
their choice by the fact that the minority happens to be in a position of 
disadvantage. Thus, it seems urgent to provide solid ground for minorities’ 
members in order to enable them to freely enjoy their fundamental rights in a 
position of equality in relation to the majority.  
The acknowledgement of this disadvantage, which is t e starting point for 
appreciating a theory of cultural rights for minorities’ members, can be ethically 
understood only through assuming an impersonal perspective, which requires 
undertaking an objective point of view on the assesment of equality.19 Embracing 
                                                
17 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 189, 
and Leslie Green, ‘Internal Minorities and Their Rights’, in Baker J. (ed.), Group Rights (Toronto, 
London: University of Toronto Press, 1994), p. 105.  
18 On the topic if culture as reference for individual choice and for the process of identity-building, 
see Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, pp. 164-165; Charles Taylor, Sources of the 
Self: the Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 27-
29.On the topic of rights for cultural minorities, ee Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and 
Culture, pp. 149-154. 
19 This position recalls Adam Smith’s ‘impersonal spectator’, which is aimed at the rightful 
direction of one’s moral behaviour. For reference on Smith’s account, see Adam Smith, The 





this perspective enables us to determine the legitimacy of rights and duties for the 
protection of cultural membership. Additionally, it allows the identification of the 
appropriate holders of these rights and duties. Impersonality represents an 
important tool for appreciating minorities’ members’ claims, particularly because 
it enables these claims to be acknowledged from an objective perspective, rather 
than from a partial view. In fact, the outlook that ought to be taken into account 
asks for recognition of a disadvantage from a super partes point of view. In this 
situation, the need to fulfil the requirements of impersonality requires the 
recognition for the achievement of equal treatment against the position of 
disadvantage in which members of minority cultural groups have to live.20 This is 
illustrated by Thomas Nagel, who affirms that: 
 
‘[…] Since objectivity also has its significance with respect to values 
and the justification of conduct, the impersonal standpoint plays an 
essential role in the evaluation of political institutions. […] Things do 
not simply cease to matter when viewed impersonally, nd we are 
forced to recognize that they matter not only to particular individuals 
or groups’.21   
 
In contrast with this position, it seems that the pers ective adopted by 
several communitarians rejects the view of impersonality for embracing an 
approach that emphasises differences. Young argues for the need of a 
differentiated citizenship, which would legitimately recognize the social 
divergences existing among members of different cultural groups.22 According to 
                                                
20 This is the meaning that Thomas Nagel confers to the need of finding a point of resolution 
between what he calls the ‘personal’ and the ‘impersonal’ standpoints [Thomas Nagel, Equality 
and Partiality, (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 10-20]. On this respect, 
Nagel argues for a solution that sees these two perspectives satisfied and recognized in a 
harmonious way. ‘A legitimate system is one which reconciles the two universal principles of 
impartiality and reasonable partiality so that no one can object that his interests are not being 
accorded sufficient weight or that the demands made on him are excessive’ (Nagel, Equality and 
Partiality, p. 38).  
21 Nagel, Equality and Partiality, pp. 10-11. 
22 On the concept of differentiated citizenship, see Iris M. Young, ‘Polity and Group Difference: A 





her view, universality, in modern liberal states, has to be intended as ‘sameness’, 
which is contrary to the principles of generality and equal treatment.23 Therefore, 
Young’s conclusion touches upon the need of intending citizenship in a different 
sense than the one in which it is currently conceived: any member of each cultural 
group should have a unique treatment on the basis of his special claims. For this 
reason Young affirms that ‘the ideal of impartiality is an idealist fiction’,24 in that 
it does not register fundamental differences among citizens. Young’s main aim is 
therefore to re-equilibrate the two dimensions of private and public and to allow 
differences in culture, social and economic status to be recognized in both 
realms.25 According to Young, in order to achieve this goal, the public sphere 
should cease to use the current principle of universality and adopt a closer 
approach to the recognition of different social claims.26  
Young’s perspective represents a radical solution to the challenges that 
claims of recognition set. It is unquestionable that differences should be 
acknowledged not only in the private but also in the public realm, but adopting a 
differentiated citizenship seems not to truly appreciate the important featurs 
introduced by the liberal principles.27 Undertaking Young’s view would lead to 
the unbalanced situation that accords privileges only for some specific classes of 
citizens.28 Furthermore, the radical rejection of the principle of impartiality denies 
the acknowledgment of differences in opportunities in the social realm and the 
recognition of minority claims as worthy over social justice. Impartiality, 
therefore, enables inequality of opportunities to be conceptualised and recognised. 
As long as an impartial point of view on the contemplation of social issues would 
be adopted by the society, minorities’ members’ claims would be recognized and 
discussed. Therefore, impartiality does not lead to the condition of homogeneity 
                                                
23 Young, ‘Polity and Group Difference’, p. 251.  
24 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, p. 104. Young interchanges the two notions of 
impartiality and impersonality in her criticism to ‘the ideal of impartiality’; for  further reference, 
see Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, pp. 96-97.  
25 Young, ‘Polity and Group Difference’, p. 255.  
26 Young, ‘Polity and group Difference’, p. 255.  
27 Young, ‘Polity and Group Difference’, p. 251. 
28 See Barry’s discussion over ‘status inequalities’ caused by policies of special treatment for 
disadvantaged people, in Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 116. Giovanni Sartori, Pluralismo, 





that Young rejects; rather it allows people to adopt a erspective that is detached 
from their particular interests. It is only through t is point of view that other 
people’s claims could be understood.  
Impartiality also represents the key concept for acknowledging the worth of 
personal choice. Only through adopting an impartial perspective, can personal 
attitudes be respectfully recognized and protected. In contrast, partiality produces 
differentiation, which leads to the danger of marginalisation and segregation of 
cultural minorities outside the boundaries of the majority culture.29 This is 
demonstrated, for example, by the condition of margin lisation in which people of 
black communities live in the suburbs of Paris and New York, or by the life 
conditions of Indigenous people in Canada.  Therefore, it seems that the partial 
standpoint produces opposite outcomes than the ones i itially aimed at. 
Impartiality protects freedom of choice, as it does not provide any judgement or 
indication of preferences to orientate people in their choices. However, 
impartiality does not mean denying the role of prefe nces in choice; it only does 
not force people to choose any type of preference from any particular cultural 
context. This is particularly important as it will be argued that freedom of choice 
represents a fundamental aspect in legitimising the a tribution of cultural rights. It 
is in fact through the justification of the instrumental value of choice, of the 
objective worth of culture, and through the demonstration of cultural membership 
as a key element for the formation of one’s choice that rights for cultural 
protection can be legitimised.30 The question remains of whether these rights 
should be intended as collective or individual. Befor  engaging the arguments that 
protect the legal existence of cultural rights, it is vital to explain why choice is 
important in one’s life.  
 
1.3. Freedom of Choice and Its Implications.  
                                                
29 Barry, Culture and Equality, pp. 116-117.  
30 On the definition of ‘objective value’, see Christine M. Korsgaard, ‘Two Distinctions in 





Choice represents the primary element through which individuals’ basic liberties 
take form.31 Through the exercise of free choice, people can express their own 
individuality and therefore achieve their ideal well-being.32 This is the structure of 
the argument proposed by John Stuart Mill in defence of the instrumental worth of 
liberty for the achievement of the greater intrinsic value of individuality.33 
According to Mill, freedom of choice means ability to freely express oneself, to 
follow one’s own plans of life and to associate with other fellow human beings 
following one’s tastes and preferences.34 As a consequence, freedom of choice is 
the opposite of any form of social or cultural assimilation, which instead wants to 
build individuals according to social customs and traditions. Against assimilation, 
Mill argues for free use of one’s capacities of creation and reasoning, which is 
possible only if freedom of choice is granted.35 Furthermore, according to Mill, 
freedom of choice is not limited to the private sphere, but it includes one’s 
freedom to ‘carry his opinions into practice at his own cost’.36 This is achieved by 
the public promulgation and institutionalisation ofpractices, which can be 
recognised as worthy in the debate on social justice only if acted in the public 
social sphere. People should be free not only in making personal and original 
thoughts, but also in carrying these thoughts on into a concrete life plan.37 In this 
sense, Mill demonstrates the value of free choice in planning one’s life through 
the justification of freedom of thought.  
The same argument used by Mill for legitimising one’s freedom of 
planning one’s own life could also be used for affirming that free choice is 
instrumentally valuable to the expression of one’s identity (which represents an 
intrinsic value in itself). Saying that free choice enables one’s individuality to be 
freely shaped implies affirming that freedom of choi e is a necessary tool for the 
conceptualisation and the expression of one’s indivduality. It is now extremely 
                                                
31 John S. Mill, On liberty, in focus (edited by John Gray and G. W. Smith, London: Routledge, 
1991), p. 73.  
32 Mill, On Liberty, p. 73.  
33 Mill, On Liberty, pp. 71-73. 
34 Mill, On Liberty, p. 33. 
35 Mill, On Liberty, pp. 74-75. 
36 Mill, On Liberty, p. 72.  





important to answer three main questions: how do peple come to the 
conceptualisation of their choices? How can they choose among the different 
options that are open to them? Which is the decisive element that makes them 
decide for either of the paths they can go through? The choice-making process has 
been the object of several interpretations. Competing arguments will now be 
considered in order to investigate the debate on this topic.  
According to Mill, choices are the result of one’s attitudes and tastes, 
which arise from the rational interpretation of one’s xperience.38 Although the 
two notions of experience and culture have different meanings, they are not 
entirely detached. If experience can be defined as the past events encountered in 
life, culture is intended as the background context in which these experiences can 
be understood. Therefore, experience is always formed in a context of action, 
which in turn always refers to a cultural environment. In this sense, although these 
two notions have divergent meanings, a link is established between the two, in 
reference to one’s attitude in making choices. 
The connection between culture and choice represents the key point of the 
arguments advanced by multiculturalists and communitarians. Michael Sandel, in 
his criticism of Rawls’s account of choice, affirms that two paths are open to an 
individual in the process of choice-making.39 On the one hand, the individual 
properly chooses his ends (if they are not part of one’s identity) as a consequence 
of an act of detachment of the ends from the self. On the other hand, if the ends 
that he wants to choose are instead part of his individuality, the individual does 
not choose them; rather he comes by his ends throug an act of self-reflection in 
his cognitive dimension.40 According to Sandel, in this second situation, the
sources of one’s ends cannot be chosen, because they aris  from a personal 
understanding of the self.41 Therefore, on his account choice is open for an 
individual only through an act of introspection and i  the context of a framework 
of meaningful options. 
                                                
38 Mill, On Liberty, pp. 74- 75. 
39 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982), pp. 56-58.  
40 Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p. 58. 





Charles Taylor partly agrees with Sandel’s perspectiv , although he 
particularly stresses the need of background conditi s that make individual 
choices meaningful or even possible.42 According to Taylor, individuals have to 
choose among the options that constitute the values of the horizon in which their 
culture is expressed.43 Choices are therefore restricted to the limits established by 
the culture that constitute one’s individuality. In this respect, according to Taylor 
there is no such thing as the choice of one’s identty; instead, this process springs 
from the cultural group in which one was born and brought up. 
In the name of the indiscernible link between identity and culture, any 
cultural group should, for Taylor, be recognised as independent and it should 
benefit from a right of autonomy. However, the discussion that Taylor undertakes 
focuses solely on Western cultures, in which the two hypergoods of autonomy and 
dignity of individuals represent accepted key points i  the establishment of any 
social or institutional relationship.44 By specifically referring to the Western 
culture, Taylor guarantees the coherence of a system that requires both 
recognition of groups as horizons and individuals as a subject deserving respect. 
Nonetheless, his account does not consider and evense ms to protect those 
cultures that, in theory, promulgate the submission of women, the denial of 
homosexuality or include genital mutilation in their cultural practices. Taylor’s 
account of hypergoods is thus ambiguous and dangerous to affirm as the result of 
a rational debate around the protection of any cultural group.  
This outcome underlines that the notion of individuality must be kept as a 
fixed point in any discussion over the role of culture in the social realm. An 
opposite view would diminish the central element of respect for individuals that 
anyone must hold independently of any other value. This challenge is part of the 
liberal critique delivered to the communitarian overprotection of invasive 
practices legitimised in the name of the culture. Martha Nussbaum affirms that the 
accommodation of different religions, for example, can happen only if the 
                                                
42 Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University 
Press, c1991), pp. 38-39.  
43 Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, pp. 38-39.  





members of the religious groups show respect for humans’ central capabilities.45 
For Nussbaum, the categories of capabilities correspond to the basic requirements 
that make a life worth living;46 therefore, the acceptance of cultural practices 
follows the assurance of the respect of the individual’s autonomy and integrity.  
Taylor does not underestimate the relevance that individual integrity holds 
in his portrait of cultural groups.47 According to him, recognition rises primarily 
from those aspects that make a life worth living and that, in his opinion, are 
connected both to individuals as such and to their cultural groups. However, his 
account refers specifically to cultural groups rather than to individuals, because 
cultural membership is a good that is brought forward by a community of 
members rather than by a single individual. Although Taylor affirms that freedom 
and autonomy are important aspects to be enhanced i questions of social justice, 
they have to be intended as freedom and autonomy for individuals who are 
already part of a cultural horizon of reference. 
Nonetheless, it seems unsustainable to justify that a group holds rights by 
departing from the acknowledgment of the status of gr ups as independent from 
its members, as Taylor tends to do. In contrast, this acknowledgment must rise 
from the recognition of individuals as necessary elements composing groups. Any 
justification of rights to individuals must therefore touch upon the centrality of 
individuality as a key point for holding any right of cultural protection.  
In this sense, the view adopted here can be compared to the one adopted 
by Young, who, in Justice and the Politics of Difference, handles the topic of 
identity and affirms that stating that social groups determine individual identities 
is a dangerous threat to the enhancement of differenc s among people.48 
According to Young, theories of identity tend to homogenise individuals, by 
neutralizing differences under the same categorization instead of collaborating in 
their promulgation.49 When involuntarily assimilated, people’s individualities are 
                                                
45 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, p. 204.  
46 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, p. 5.  
47 Taylor, Sources of the Self, pp. 14-15. 
48 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, pp. 98-99.  
49 In relation to Young’s thought, the ideals of assimilation that she contrasts are those ideals that 





deleted for the sake of promulgating the thought of the majority.  
Young, therefore, does not embrace the view of many communitarian 
thinkers, such as Taylor, who identify social groups with small communities. 
According to Young, the attribution of fixed identities to individuals would lead 
‘to conceptualize entities in terms of substance rather than process or relation’.50 
Therefore, Young claims that the danger of talking  terms of identities is 
represented by the tendency to spread assimilation, which blurs differences among 
individuals and categorises them into formal identities.51 
The positions exposed so far raise several questions: are people able to 
choose their ends without any background of values? Or, on a deeper level, is the 
mind a ‘tabula rasa’, not influenced by any antecednt belief arising from the 
traditional values inherited throughout time? The answer to these questions, which 
is analysed in the following chapter, will provide the starting point for the 
understanding of the role of culture in directing one’s choices of life and its 
possible legal protection. 
                                                                                                                           
(Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, pp. 58-61) and ‘assimilationist ideals’ that do not
enable people to keep their cultural expressions in the public sphere of a state (Young, Justice and 
the Politics of Difference, pp. 158-163). 
50 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, p. 98.  
51 For an extended perspective on the implications of the categorisation of individuals into 
identities, see Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence: the Illusion of Destiny (London: Allen Lane, 






The Right of Cultural Membership 
 
In the context of the debate proposed in the previous chapter, two major 
viewpoints can be underlined: the liberal and the communitarian perspectives. A 
more appealing intermediate position exists between the multicultural 
communitarian view that sees culture as the primary and essential element for 
one’s choice and the liberal view that instead conceives free choice as the 
fundamental element for the expression of one’s indiv duality and for the 
achievement of one’s well-being. This position grants the value of free choice and 
shows that no choice toward the pursuit of one end rather than another can be 
made without a previous evaluation of preferences within one’s cultural context.  
 
2.1. An Intermediate Position for Meaningful Choice s.  
Sandel’s critique of the role of choice in Rawls’s original position stresses the 
importance of the two notions of circumstances and prerequisites for the process 
of choice-making.52 However, autonomy and freedom, in the context of individual 
identity, are the required instruments for self-understanding. What thinkers such 
as Sandel, Taylor and others53 object to is that these aspects are strongly 
connected to the social context in which people grow up and to which they relate, 
evaluate and scrutinise their beliefs. According to these authors, any defence of 
the role of choice as the first element in the process of identity building implies 
the adoption of the ‘naturalistic view’, which affirms that the only common 
element that people share is their membership in the human race.54 Culture shapes 
those moral attitudes and considerations on the good and bad that a person 
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maintains since childhood. Choices, as long as they represent the external act of a 
deeper understanding of the self, will be in accordance with one’s beliefs and 
therefore with one’s culture. Two points of concern ca  here be levied against the 
possibility of free choice. First, do individuals choose in relation to the cultural 
context in which they are inevitably embedded? Second, is it possible to draw a 
space for the exercise of free choice? 
Holding an intermediate position between liberals and communitarians 
requires a deep analysis on the sense of the expression ‘meaningful choice’.55 A 
choice is meaningful when it is consciously undertaken by an individual and it 
plays an important role in the planning of one’s life. Thus, if it is justifiable to let 
the individual be free to express his convictions ad ffiliations to a culture, one 
should also be free to benefit from his right of exit and to leave the cultural group 
he belongs to.56 In fact, it seems unsustainable to affirm that one can choose 
outside the cultural context, as long as each choice that one makes is linked to a 
cultural aspect.57 Choices can be made only by selecting one of the options that 
are at stake, i.e. one of the cultures that are available. Therefore, in this context, 
choice is always linked to the agreement (or disagreement) with the constitutive 
elements of a particular culture.  
It thus seems that to affirm both that meaningful choi es are only linked to 
the cultural context in which one belongs and that ere is no such right to exit 
from a group results in a restrictive and illiberal view, and consequently in 
assimilation.58 Hence, another important aspect connected to the notion of 
meaningful choices must also be the voluntary acceptance of the context required 
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Vol. 20, No. 1 (Feb. 1992), p. 128.   
57The tight connection between choices and culture is underlined by the communitarian stream of 
thought. For further reference, see Kymlicka’s definition of ‘societal cultures’, in Kymlicka, 
Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 75-.106, in particular pp. 82-93.  Furthermore, this view implies the 
adoption of a universalistic approach that sees each cultural expression and affiliation as the 
constitution of a cultural group, as analysed in the section 1.2.   





by the choice. In this respect, the individual freely directs his thoughts and beliefs 
toward the cultural group that best represents them. Prohibiting the choice of a 
cultural affiliation in relation to one’s individuality would mean denying one’s 
freedom of thought and expression.  
Hence, two elements are involved in the definition of meaningful choice: 
(1) freedom of choice; (2) actual options of choice (which imply the need of 
protecting all cultural groups that promote the well-b ing of their members). From 
the acknowledgment of these two elements, it can be affirmed that culture holds 
both an objective and an instrumental value as it constitutes the context of actual 
options of choice that enables the realisation of the higher value of freedom of 
choice.59 In order to explain this position, an analysis of the connection between 
the values of culture and of choice will be undertaken.  
 
2.2. Which Value for Culture? 
Freedom of choice (or freedom of making meaningful choices) is universally 
conceived as an intrinsically valuable principle according to both the liberal and 
the communitarian thesis. People ought to be free to choose those values and 
goals that are important for their lives and to deci  which paths to undertake for 
their achievement.60 Affirming that something holds an intrinsic value means that 
it has goodness in itself and that it does not acquire its value from anything else.61 
In modern times, several philosophical perspectives have brought too much 
confusion to the two notions of ‘intrinsic value’ and ‘value for its own sake’, the 
latter of which refers to the value that a thing holds for being an end in itself.62 It 
is important to keep these two notions separate, in order to avoid 
misunderstanding on the topic and to accord the corre t value to culture.  
On many perspectives, among which Will Kymlicka’s position plays a 
primary role, freedom of shaping one’s own life constitutes an end in itself and 
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62 Korsgaard, ‘Two Distinctions in Goodness’. An example of a misinterpretation of ‘intrinsic 
value’ and value for its own sake’ is represented by John O’Neill, ‘The Varieties of Intrinsic 
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therefore it is highly valuable.63 Rawls accords extreme importance on the value 
of freedom of advancing life plans and affirms that ‘[…] the worth of liberty to 
persons and groups depends upon their capacity to advance their ends within the 
framework the system defines’.64 However, it remains unclear whether culture 
holds intrinsic or extrinsic value and whether it is an end in itself or a means for 
the realisation of a higher end.65  
Any position that would attribute an intrinsic value to culture should be 
able to affirm that culture is a good in itself and that this is true independent of 
any contextual condition in which it is embedded.66 It should therefore 
demonstrate what George E. Moore names the ‘method of isolation’, which 
argues that for a good to be intrinsically valuable, it must preserve its value even 
if detached from any other value.67 Culture, for its own constitutive features, is a 
continuous movable element, which evolves with the society throughout time. 
Therefore, it cannot be affirmed that culture can hold any intrinsic value as it does 
not represent a fixed identical good at all times. Furthermore, something is 
intrinsically valuable only if independent of anyone’s desires and interests.68 
Hence, the possibility of affirming that individuals hold an interest in the 
preservation of their culture, does not imply that culture is good in itself. This is 
true for two reasons. First, cultural worth must norely on external relations; 
second, the value that members accord to their culture ‘varies with the 
circumstances in which the thing [to be valued] is found’.69 
Following a theory that intends extrinsic value as a value derived other 
sources, the logical connection that has been drawn between culture and the value 
of free choice in life planning opens a possibility for culture to hold an extrinsic 
value, in that it does not represent a good for itself but in relation to the good of 
something else that is intrinsically valuable. In this respect, the position that sees 
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culture as the condition for the realisation of thehighest value of freedom of 
choice can legitimately be held in light of the fact that different cultures represent 
the actual options available to be chosen. Culture represents a channel through 
which people plan their lives, insofar as culture synthesises a set of values and 
beliefs for the promotion of the lives of its members. However, what is important 
to highlight is that culture does not just represent ‘o e’ channel, but rather it 
constitutes ‘the’ necessary condition for the application of intrinsic value of 
freedom of choice.70 Without cultural reference, people would not be able to give 
meaning to their lives, as they would lack those necessary directions for 
formulating choices of intrinsic worth.71 Hence, culture represents one of the 
constitutive conditions for meaningful choices to be made, as it provides the 
background for the evaluation of one’s thoughts and beliefs and for the realisation 
of one’s life plans.  
Additionally, it would be disrespectful to degrade the role of culture to a 
means for the realisation of an intrinsic good. Although a thing does not hold an 
intrinsic value, it does not mean that it can only be an instrument for the 
achievement of a higher value. This is because culture is the necessary condition 
for meaningful choices to be conceptualised. Rationl choice holds a value in 
itself, in that it represents a good that is not related to any spatial or temporal 
circumstance. For example, the value of the ‘good will’ holds intrinsic worth, as it 
represents the power of making meaningful choices common to all rational human 
beings.72 Thus, an extrinsic value refers to some relations r conditions that its 
holder must have in order to be considered valuable. A condition of this kind is 
therefore constituted by culture, which represents the relevant requirement for the 
realisation of one’s ‘good will’. Culture, as previously underlined, is the 
framework in which choices are made and in which one’s freedom of choice can 
be entirely realised. It can thus be argued that culture is instrumentally valuable 
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or, in the Kantian lexicon, that it is objectively good.73 This is because it is 
conditionally valuable to the realisation of some circumstances, such as the fact 
that it enables meaningful choices to be actualised.74 The statement of the 
objective good of culture is of particular importance because: 
 
‘[…] it allows us to say of certain things that they are valuable only 
under certain circumstances, or valuable only when c rtain other 
things are true or present, without forcing us to say that these kinds 
of things must be valuable merely as instruments’.75 
 
In these lines, Christine Korsgaard illustrates thefundamental worth of those 
elements that contribute to establish the intrinsic worth of high values. Culture can 
be included among these elements and its value cannot be degraded to be simply 
instrumental for the realisation of choice.  
 
2.3. Cultural Rights: Cultural Membership as a Prim ary Good. 
Having stated that culture is objectively valuable and that it ought to be evaluated 
through an intermediate position that sees the individual as free, the discussion 
turns now to the possibility of culture to be protected by any form of right. Can 
cultural rights be justified through the statement of he objective value of culture? 
To assert that the objective value of culture is sufficient to generate cultural rights, 
it should be demonstrated that, in principle, any objective value sufficiently 
justifies the generation of a right. In order to prvide an answer to this challenge, 
a comparison will be set between the two notions of cultural membership and 
primary goods.76 This connection has already been set by Kymlicka, who draws a 
link between Rawls’s list of primary goods and the worth of cultural 
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membership.77 Kymlicka’s argument is particularly convincing and it is highly 
relevant in stressing the importance of cultural memb rship in the realm of 
liberalism. 
Rawls names primary goods as those goods that any individual has reason 
to want independently of her contingent ends.78 He lists them as those ‘rights, 
liberties, and opportunities, and income and wealth’ that any rational individual 
wants to be preserved in her life.79 Therefore, primary goods are those 
‘preconditions’ that assure the pursuit of one’s life plans, i.e. those necessary 
elements that an individual should benefit from in order to be in an equal position 
to pursue her ends as anyone else in the society.80 For example, self-respect is 
included by Rawls as a fundamental precondition for the enjoyment of any good, 
because it represents the necessary requirement for making any life plan that holds 
a value for the individual.81 Therefore, without self-respect choices could not even 
be conceptualised because the individual would not be able to recognise the value 
of her being and of her projects.82 
The justification for ascribing the notion of cultural membership as a 
primary good ought to rely on the reasons that individuals have to want their 
cultural membership preserved independently of any contingent end. Furthermore, 
cultural membership ought to be an instrument aimed at guaranteeing the 
preservation of the principle of fairness for an egalitarian society.  
Positing cultural membership as a primary good, however, does not imply 
saying that members ought to remain loyal to the group no matter what the 
decisions of the cultural group are. Cultural membership is not irreversible. If the 
cultural group adopts practices that are disrespectful of individuals’ dignity and 
integrity, then the individuals have justifiable reasons for claiming the right to exit 
the group that they are affiliated with. Therefore, p ople have reason to want 
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cultural membership to be a primary good, as long as it represents the necessary 
tool for the conceptualisation of meaningful choices and for the planning of one’s 
life. However, they also have the right to exit the group they are members of, 
whether or not circumstances require it. It seems that an inconsistency may occur 
between the need to establish cultural membership as a primary good and the need 
to establish a right to renounce the membership of this primary good. A possible 
criticism on this position could affirm that a right to exit from the group 
undermines the legitimacy of cultural membership as a necessary primary good, 
as long as people have reasons to benefit from the possibility to leave the cultural 
collective they live in. 
A defence for the statement of cultural membership as a primary good, or 
in other words, as a right to the preservation of one’s culture, must touch upon 
two aspects: (1) the fundamental importance that cultural membership holds for 
any individual; (2) the costs implied in the act of leaving one’s cultural group. 
Cultural membership is a basic element in one’s life, as it actualises those 
fundamental channels for the capability of making meaningful choices. Joining a 
cultural group therefore requires agreeing to those dir ctions that are put forward 
by a culture and to make them part of one’s self. Culture, in this sense, makes 
sense of one’s identity, in that it offers the possibility of realising one’s self in the 
social context, because it provides the space in which identity develops. In this 
sense, the role that cultural groups hold for one’s s lf can be appreciated, as they 
preserve the cultural environment in which individuals’ meaningful choices can 
be actualised.  
The costs of changing one’s identity are not to be underestimated. Cultural 
membership is a symbol of the expression of the traits of one’s identity; hence, it 
deals with the fundamental being of an individual and to her rational capacities of 
choice and plan making.83 Leaving the group of affiliation sometimes requires 
paying a high cost in return, as it necessitates changing some parts of one’s 
identity that are fundamental to the individual. In order to elucidate the depth of 
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this cost, some examples will be used, which stress three of the elements that 
represent the more basic components and fundamental fu ctions of the individual 
in relation with cultural membership. These elements are respectively: (a) 
language; (b) religion; (c) rites and traditions. By elucidating these aspects, the 
importance of the affiliation to a cultural group will be shown, which will lead to 
the clarification of the status of cultural membership as a primary good.  
(a) For the first example, suppose that A is a member of cultural group X that 
has the peculiarity of using a different language from the official language 
publicly adopted by the members of the majority culture of a state.84 In 
this example, if A chooses to be a member of the culture that X brings 
forward, it means that he is ready to use X’s language and all its 
correlative aspects, such as idioms, cultural and under textual references. 
However, usually people do not explicitly choose to join a culture 
(although in some cases this may occur), rather they have been influenced 
in their upbringing by the culture their parents have chosen or inherited 
from their ancestors. Changing cultural groups, in this sense, requires 
having to learn another language, other idioms and other cultural 
references that constitute the linguistic realm of a particular culture. 
Hence, in this circumstance, for A to leave his cultural group X exacts a 
very high cost, incurred by the necessity of learning another language and 
assimilating his identity to a new linguistic culture. Consequently, this 
change implies a loss in the cultural references that are part of A’s identity 
and that represent the fundamental traits of his character. This example 
elucidates how difficult it could be to choose to leave one’s cultural group. 
Renouncing one’s cultural membership is therefore nt a  arbitrary choice, 
rather it implies renouncing a fundamental part of one’s self, such as one’s 
first language. 
(b) For the second example, suppose that A is a member of cultural group Y 
that is a separate religious minority. Her being part of that cultural group is 
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constituted by the acceptance and practice of those rituals that constitute 
her religion. A’s ordinary day is thus composed of the practices that are 
linked to her religion. In addition, her religious affiliation also symbolises 
a series of values and beliefs that A intimately follows and that constitute 
the lenses through which she articulates her life. Her cultural membership, 
therefore, symbolises a part of her identity, which could be of more or less 
relevance according to the contingent situation in which A finds herself in 
her life. Thus, leaving the cultural group A is member of means 
overcoming the difficulty of renouncing the part of her identity that is 
linked to her religious credo. The cost of refusing her religious affiliation 
must therefore be taken into account by A at the moment of choosing to 
benefit from her right to exit form the group. Thus, even though a right to 
leave the cultural group must be taken for granted in order to avoid 
dictatorial behaviours of the group toward its membrs, it must be borne in 
mind that the costs associated with the exit from a cultural group are very 
high for any individual. In fact, they require abando ing a part of one’s 
true identity and denying the liberty of making choices full of meaning for 
one’s life. 
(c) For the third example, A is a member of cultural group Z that has the 
specificity of being a minority group in a larger state, where the culture of 
the majority is different from the culture that is brought forward in the 
context of the group Z. Therefore, the secular rites and traditions that e 
members of Z advance are not those endorsed by the majority. In this 
scenario, A (and with him all the members of Z) finds himself in a 
condition of disadvantage regarding the possibilities that he has of 
practicing those rituals that are part of the culture of his group not only in 
the private, but also in the public sphere.85 This is because the state in 
question does not provide any particular protection f r the public 
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expression of other cultures in the social sphere. This does not mean that 
these cultures are openly discriminated against, but only that unequal 
attention is given to guaranteeing fair opportunities available for A as for a 
member of the majority culture. A simple, however discriminatory, 
solution to this problem is provided by A’s right to exit from Z for joining 
the group that expresses the majority culture. Nevertheless, this operation 
would force A to realise himself in an environment that is not the one that 
reflects his identity, but in one that is foreign to his self and his life plans. 
Once again, the costs of exit from Z that A has to face are extremely high: 
they include having to reorganise one’s primary life plans in a different 
context, which promotes traditions and beliefs that are different from the 
ones in which A relies on. In addition, the reason that supports A’s exit 
from Z is only sustained as a consequence of a disadvantage th t A has to 
face as member of a culture that is in minority in relation to a wider 
cultural context.  
The analysis of these three examples demonstrates that the costs that members 
of cultural groups have to pay for exiting from their cultural group of reference 
are extremely demanding as they require the modification of one’s identity and 
aspirations. Therefore, even though any theory that supports the centrality of the 
individual must take into account a right for members to leave their cultural 
affiliation, this does not mean that exercising this right is an easy decision. 
Changing cultural membership involves a high level of compromises for an 
individual, which inevitably disrupts the constitutve and fundamental traits of 
one’s identity and ability to make meaningful and genuine life plans. Therefore, 
the two rights of protection of culture, namely the statement of cultural 
membership as a primary good, and of exit from one’s cultural group are not in 
contradiction; they represent two options for two different sets of situations. In 
fact, the right to exit from a cultural group is usually not enjoyed by members 
unless the group takes advantage of them, or the members of the group in question 
are in a condition of disadvantage in relation to the members of the majority 





being of its members, the position of a right of exit from a cultural group 
guarantees the inefficacy of this behaviour. Whereas, in the second case, the 
condition of disadvantage as a reason for leaving a culture constitutes a situation 
that supports the claim for the legitimacy of indivi ual rights for cultural 
protection.  
 
2.4. Cultural Rights, for Whom? 
Now, it has already been shown that culture holds an objective value, in that 
voluntarily belonging to a cultural group enables meaningful choice to be made. 
Cultural membership as primary good constitutes a precondition for any choice to 
be conceptualised, as culture supplies the context in which choices are made.86 
More specifically, culture is not just a channel for articulating meaningful choices, 
but it is the fundamental condition for choices to be made.87 In this sense, culture 
is the grounds for the understanding of the meaning of choices, in that it provides 
a content from which people can make choices for their plans of life. Just as 
rights, liberties, opportunities, income and wealth re the primary goods that one 
has reason to want independently of any contingent end,88 cultural membership is 
also such a primary good necessary for making meaningful choices. This allows 
individuals to choose their directions and shape thir lives towards the 
accomplishment of some values and beliefs.89 Incidentally, one could 
acknowledge the necessary status of primary goods fr cultural membership 
through justice as recognition rather than as distribution.90 
Comparing cultural membership with primary goods entails focusing on 
the centrality of the individual as a cultural member rather than on the centrality 
of the group as a presumed entity. The justification of potential cultural rights 
must therefore rely upon the individual as right-bearer rather than upon the 
cultural group: this is because culture is valuable only in relation to the single 
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individual, which is the fundamental component of the culture. In order to 
elucidate this point, a comparison between the position that intends cultural 
membership as a primary good and Taylor’s communitarian thought will be set.91 
For the purpose of this comparison, Taylor’s positin on the foundation of culture 
as a horizon of choice will be challenged to justify the worth of culture on an 
individual basis.92 
 
2.4.1. Taylor’s Notion of Horizon. 
Taylor’s definition of horizon refers to a cultural background that is constitutive 
of one’s identity. According to this position, individuals are dialogical beings, 
who develop linguistic and original thoughts in relation to their referential cultural 
context.93 Culture is therefore intended in terms of a horizon of commonality and 
it can be actualised only in relation to the cultural group of reference. Taylor’s 
account of horizon addresses a fixed concept of culture, which represnts the 
element of commonality between members of a same cultural group. Self-
determining freedom is therefore linked to a prior conceptualisation of the 
individual in the context of the cultural horizon he belongs to. Hence, according to 
Taylor, individual identity and the horizon of culture are two indiscernible 
concepts. 
Under this conception, choice plays only a side role in issue of self-
identity, as, for Taylor, identity can only be ‘discovered’, not chosen.94 This 
position holds that the group (intended as an entity independent of its members), 
not the culture, is the framework of choice. It thus legitimises decisions that the 
group may undertake against the well-being of some f the group’s members. 
This definition of horizon seems to intend a personification of groups with a sort 
of overall legislator, similar to the Hobbesian Leviathan, which decides which 
options are open to the members for the conceptualisation of their beliefs and the 
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planning of their lives. The notion of horizon tends therefore to restrict the 
freedom of choice that is open to all individuals; particularly, it restricts their 
possibility to exit or enter the cultural group. It seems in fact that the group 
conclusively forges members’ identities, which acquire their meaning only in the 
relation to existence of the group. According to Taylor:  
 
 ‘[…] I can define my identity only against the background of 
things that matter. […] Only if I exist in a world in which history, 
or the demands of nature, or the needs of my fellow human beings, 
or the duties of citizenship, or the call of God, or s mething else of 
this order matters crucially, can I define an identity for myself tha 
is not trivial’.95  
 
Taylor’s account is subject to several criticisms. First, the notion of 
horizon appears to be too restrictive for one’s ability to make meaningful choices. 
In fact, Taylor’s position does not acknowledge theneed for freedom of choice, 
which is a fundamental condition, along with the cultural background, to 
consciously articulate meaningful decisions. Although Taylor acknowledges the 
notion of self-determining freedom, his account fails because it neglects the 
fundamental role that free choice has in the formation of one’s individuality.96 
This criticism is not intended to undermine the importance of a cultural 
background for the act of choice-making. In contrast, having a cultural horizon is 
fundamental for this process, but it must be accompanied by its counterpart, i.e. 
freedom of choice (point (1) of the definition of meaningful choices previously 
provided). The opposite view would result in a process of forced assimilation to 
common thoughts and opinions deemed proper by the dominant culture.  
Second, if the same procedure for the denial of the individual freedom of 
choice is applied to cultural groups, an act of assimilation of the minorities to the 
majority would be inevitable. Therefore, Taylor’s argument is self-invalidating, as 
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its application on other levels undermines the spirit of the conclusion that it aims 
to achieve.  
Third, Taylor’s position suggests that there must be a distinction between 
different kinds of cultures and that only those cultures that promote values such as 
the respect of nature and of individuals, the respect for the common life and for 
any religious affiliation, can be considered as valid horizons for one’s choice.97 It 
seems that the articulation of this thought affirms a form of superiority of those 
cultures that correspond to this restricted range of values and undermines any 
other cultural context in which these kinds of beliefs are not promoted, even if 
these cultures contribute to the well-being of their members and are valuable for 
them.    
In contrast to Taylor’s account of horizon, the application of the notion of 
cultural membership as a primary good for individuals introduces numerous 
benefits. In the first place, the individualistic perspective would guarantee 
freedom for individuals to join or leave cultural groups and to embrace other 
expressions of value and of life. This would also enable them to pursue one’s 
individuality in its entirety, without being forced to be subject to practices that 
deny the human worth (among these practices, we can classify genital mutilation, 
marginalisation of homosexuals, and so on). Replacing the notion of cultural 
group with an individualistic perspective on cultural membership forbids the 
conceptualisation and the application of any form of repression. In this scenario, 
individuals would be able to freely choose and plan their lives, without relying on 
a concept of culture that blocks their evolution in history. There is no moral 
imperative that does not allow cultures to regularly amend; the contrary would 
impede the development of progress and creativity. In addition, the secularisation 
of cultural groups would exacerbate the differences among people and their social 
status, without enabling people to rescue their lives and their reputation from 
those stereotypes held in the course of the history.98 
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2.4.2. Individual Cultural Rights.  
Turning now to the topic of whether rights can be attributed in relation to culture, 
it is important to understand who the bearers of these rights are. Cultural rights are 
assured by the objective value of culture and the affirmation of the primary good 
of cultural membership. However, stating that culture holds an objective worth, 
which is necessarily connected to one’s ability to make meaningful choices, does 
not necessitate attributing the same worth to cultural groups. Although culture is 
enhanced and promoted by collective practices, this does not mean that collectives 
can hold the same value that these practices have in relation to the individuals that 
promote them. Further, arguing that cultural rights can be justified from a 
collective point of view demands certain limitations.  
In his criticism against the notion of collective rights, Michael Hartney 
affirms that the logical argument supporting the legitimacy of collective rights 
begins by stating the value of communities and their n ed of being protected, for 
indiscriminately concluding that rights must be accorded to communities 
according to these premises.99 Hartney’s challenge primarily attacks the 
conclusion of this syllogism and asserts that the structure of this argument is 
inconsistent for two reasons. First, it does not dis inguish between the moral and 
the legal aspect of rights and equalizes them under the same category. Second, it 
falsely affirms that communities can have rights.100 Hartney’s justification of 
instituting individual rights refers to the fact tha  the interest in justifying a right is 
never collective but always individual.101 He asserts that ‘[…] not all goods (or 
interests) generate rights; only those which are central to the well-being of 
individuals do so’.102  
The attribution of the notion of primary goods to cultural membership 
refers specifically to individuals rather than groups; therefore, it does not imply 
any justification of cultural rights from a collective point of view. The explanation 
of the reasons that support this statement will be endorsed by acknowledging the 
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arguments behind some positions that instead support collective cultural rights. In 
particular Peter Jones’s and Joseph Raz’s perspectives on collective rights will be 
examined.103 
Jones proposes an argument that supports collective rights as the result of 
the sum of individuals’ interests, whether these interests alone would not be 
sufficient to generate rights for their protection.104 In other words, according to 
Jones, it is possible to justify collective rights in that they promote a collective 
interest produced by the basic needs of individuals. A position similar to Jones’s 
is advanced in Raz’s articulation of the notion of c llective rights.105 According to 
Raz, it is possible to talk about collective rights in view of their emergence from 
individuals’ shared interests.106 The generation of a right to protect collective 
interests must be justified by a greater advantage for the bearer of the right than 
for the holder of the corresponding duty to be subject of the duty.107 According to 
Raz, the acknowledgment of a people’s interest is asufficient reason for the 
justification of holding a collective right.108 A collective interest generates the 
attribution of a collective right as long as three fundamental conditions are 
satisfied. First, the interest must arise from an individual. Second, the individual 
in question must be a member of a group and its interes  must be beneficial for the 
whole community. Third, the individual’s interest alone is not enough to justify 
other people to hold a duty for its protection.109  
These positions are subject to challenging criticisms. David Miller points 
out that Raz’s position fails to invoke a justification of collective rights as rights 
that arise from the sum of the interests of the members of a group.110 Miller 
underlines that collective rights are not sustainable: the justification of collective 
rights fails because it does not provide enough support to the justification of the 
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collective status of the rights in question.111 This is the reason why Miller argues 
that Raz’s collective rights can only be instrumentally justified, in that they 
produce the well-being of individuals, but not of the group itself.112 For this 
reason, Miller prefers identifying collective rights as rights of citizenship, which 
are less demanding than moral or human rights for gr ups. In fact, rights of 
citizenship do not apply to a status above and beyond any contingent situation; 
they are instead conceived as fundamental elements for a specific society.113 
Miller’s conclusion affirms that group rights are lgitimated only if they claim 
equal treatment of individuals in the society, but no if they want to deliver any 
fundamental status independent of the context in which t ey are invoked.114  
Miller’s criticism of Raz’s position (and thereby of Jones’s argument for 
collective rights) provides a good explanation of the reason it is unsustainable to 
justify cultural rights from a collective point of view. Although cultural practices 
survive through collective actions, these actions are intended for the supply of a 
combination of individuals’ interests. Collectives always depend on the members 
that compose them and it would be odd to assert that there is such a metaphysical 
entity as the cultural group, which can make decision  about members’ lives 
without their consent.115 This situation would contradict the principle of freedom 
of choice, which, as previously defended, is intrinsically valuable for anyone’s 
life. Hence, as long as cultural practices are heldby individuals in community, all 
justification for the preservation of these practices through rights must rely upon 
individuals, which represent the main focal point of any cultural community.  
Although groups are highly relevant in issues of social justice, they cannot 
hold any right for the protection of a culture. Affirming that groups cannot be 
bearers of rights does not imply that they cannot require duties for their 
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protection. In this respect, the notion of interest plays a fundamental role for the 
justification of the duty to protect cultural groups and for according groups the 
proper place in any fruitful discussion over social justice.  
 
2.5. Duties for the Protection of Culture: Who is t he Holder? 
To claim that an individual has an interest in the protection of a basic good 
requires that someone else ought to hold a duty for its protection (however, this 
does not require a right for its claimant).116 For example, the absence of sufficient 
food to live entails a moral duty to provide food for one’s subsistence. The 
interest of sustaining life is therefore at the source of the duty to provide food. In 
contrast, the interest of eating more and healthier (in a situation in which the 
claimer has already enough food to live) does not etail a duty to provide a higher 
quantity and quality of food, because this interest does not touch upon a basic 
human need.  
 
‘Goods (or interests) may generate duties (e.g., of pr tection) but 
these duties do not correlate with rights, unless there is some special 
reason for protecting these goods’.117 
 
If this argument concerning the possession of food is replaced with the same 
argument for the possession of those conditions for one’s possibility of choice, it 
becomes possible to assert that members’ interest in the protection of their culture 
generates a duty of the society to protect cultures that are in minority and in 
disadvantage, given that cultural membership represnts a primary good for all 
individuals. As long as members of minorities cannot benefit from those 
circumstances that enable them to enjoy their basic rights of non-discrimination, 
equal opportunities and cultural preservation, membrs’ interest in their 
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achievement justifies a duty from the society to undertake those solutions that 
guarantee the preservation of these goods.  
It is possible to argue that, at the individual level, these duties also generate 
rights of cultural membership, because the affiliation with a cultural group 
represents a primary good that all individuals have reason to enjoy. However, this 
justification cannot be applied to the collective level, insofar as the existence of a 
group depends on the individuals that compose them. Nevertheless, the society 
holds a duty toward groups for cultural respect and equal treatment. The 
acknowledgment of the disadvantage that members of minority cultures face in 
relation to members of the majority culture is possible only if one embraces a 
collective point of view. This act enables the disavantaged members of the 
society to garner the strength necessary to create a societal duty to restore equal 
treatment through special policies. Therefore, the collective dimension of culture 
gives the ground for the acknowledgment of equal treatment for members of 
different cultural groups, and consequently supports the urgent need to restore this 
disadvantage. This aspect is important for supporting the discussion on 
capabilities for cultural groups undertaken in Chapter III.  
In order to strengthen the assumption of individual rights of cultural 
preservation, it is fundamental at this stage to highlight several features in relation 
to the bearers of the correlative duties and to the nature of the rights in question. 
In fact, it is not yet clear who is the bearer of the duties who ought to undertake 
positive actions for the right to preserve cultural membership. In addition, it is 
also obscure whether these rights should be intended in their negative or positive 
form, i.e. if they should be conceived in terms of liberties or if actions for their 
protection must be undertaken by a specific agent. The answers to these questions 
will help to understand the position and the role that rights for cultural protection 
play.  
Cécile Fabre’s complementarity thesis will support the assumption that 
defends positive rights for cultural protection.118 The argument Fabre proposes to 
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breaks the classical thought that distinguishes civil and political rights as negative, 
and social rights as positive (and therefore for the justification of positive civil 
and political rights) will represent the benchmarks that will justify the statement 
of positive individual rights of cultural protection.119 This argument will help to 
identify the state as the bearer of the duties involved in rights of cultural 
membership. The claims advanced in the following argument refer to the aspects 
connected to the publicity of cultural membership and to the unfairness of social 
opportunities that its denial produces. The duties that correspond to the rights of 
cultural preservation refer specifically to the work of the state as primary 
interlocutor in any matter involving social equality.   
As outlined by Fabre, the classical attribution of negative rights for civil and 
political rights, and of positive rights for social rights is internally inconsistent. 
Fabre demonstrates that civil and political rights may assume the form of positive 
rights, as long as they demand the intervention of a third party for the preservation 
of the object of the correlative right.120 In reference to the right of seeking justice, 
Fabre declares that: 
 
‘the right to seek redress in court, which is a civil right that all 
declarations of rights have insisted upon, is a positive right: it 
imposes a duty on the state to exercise justice, and therefore to 
provide a service to people’.121 
 
Fabre thereby stresses the character of action that the state must undertake to 
secure the right of seeking justice.122 Citizens of a state do not only have a 
negative right of non-interference with their goods, but also a positive right to 
preserve these goods, as rights for the protection of goods also imply a positive 
counterpart.  
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Negative and positive rights can thus be conceived of as two faces of the 
same coin. If on the one hand citizens of a state hv  the negative right to preserve 
their goods, on the other hand they also have the positive right to the active 
protection of these goods by an external agent. Fabre outlines this double element 
in civil, political and social rights, which she calls the complementarity thesis.123 
In setting out a list of arguments supporting universally accepted rights that 
citizens have reason to have, Fabre concludes that it is important to stress both 
positive and negative rights of citizens, as ‘they each protect interests in certain 
ways, and taken together afford full protection to these interests’.124 What is 
important to retain from Fabre’s discussion is thate complementarity thesis does 
not only posit negative social rights for the sake of autonomy and well-being. It 
also proposes the justification of positive rights that the state must undertake for 
enabling citizens to achieve the autonomy and well-b ing to which they aim.125 
Fabre’s complementarity thesis constitutes an important step towards the 
position of positive individual rights for cultural protection. This is because a 
possible objection to the thesis of positive cultural rights might rely on the fact 
that cultural membership is only a negative right: members have the right of 
having a cultural membership (in that it emblematises the meaning of the choices 
they want to make in their lives, and therefore represents a primary good), but it is 
a right of non-interference with the good of cultural membership. In the name of 
Fabre’s complementarity thesis, this objection looses its appeal. In fact, it is not
sufficient to affirm that citizens may enjoy their ‘negative’ right of cultural 
membership. What needs to be said is that they also hold a ‘positive’ right to the 
protection of their culture, which is duty of the state to preserve given that cultural 
membership represents a private as well as a public good. This discussion on 
positive cultural rights for individuals aims to affirm that there is a duty of the 
state to guarantee the preservation and the promotin f these rights in the public 
realm. For the purpose of this text, the notion of the individual right of cultural 
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membership has been outlined and supported by the ra ionales presented here in to 
a degree that enables application.  
This discussion also founds the role of special rights for cultural 
protection, as outlined by Kymlicka and Leslie Green.126 The justification of these 
rights can be conceived in terms of positive rights: in order to seek the autonomy 
and the well-being that every citizen has reason to want for his life, special rights 
should be addressed to people that suffer from a dis dvantage in relation to other 
members of the society. It is through the acknowledgment of this inequality that 
Kymlicka and Green establish the rationales behind special rights for groups. By 
departing from an empirical analysis, Kymlicka affirms that minorities’ members 
have to live with fewer opportunities than members of the majority culture, in 
terms of decision-making involvement, cultural affirmation and political 
relevance. At the theoretical level, this situation s translated into a disrespect of 
the principle of equality.127 On the basis of this argument, Kymlicka justifies the
need of special rights for groups as a form of reparation for the societal 
circumstances in which they live.128 Green agrees with this point and she 
expresses it by appealing to the concept of ex ante compensation. In her view,  
 
‘The special rights of minority cultures- the powers, liberties and 
rights that go to strengthen them- can thus be understood and 
justified as a kind of ex ante compensation. They are not a 
compromise with the requirements of justice, but a consequence of 
them’.129 
 
Although Kymlicka’s and Green’s perspectives are important for 
acknowledging the need of special rights in issues of cultural inequalities in the 
social realm, in light of the justification for cult ral rights on ground of individual 
rights advanced in the previous discussion, the position held in this text diverges 
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with them. In fact, special rights are justified at the individualistic rather than at 
the collective level. Additionally, these rights should be expressed in their positive 
form, which entails the commitment of the state to guarantee and promote those 
actual places of activity in which these rights can be practically enjoyed. These 
places of activity are institutions, which constitute the medium channel through 
which people can enjoy their rights of cultural membership in the public sphere 
and the state can deliver the benefits of these rights to their corresponding 
holders.130 On this line of argument, the notion of groups will be drawn close to 
the notion of institutions, intended as those mediums through which individual 
rights can be enjoyed and even be conceptualised.  
 
2.6. Individuals, Groups and Culture.  
The discussion advanced so far underlines a need to iscern between issues 
concerning individuals and groups. The current debate on the topic of social 
inequalities brought about by cultural differences does not provide a unique 
answer to the problem and much confusion on issues of the status of groups, 
individuals and their rights makes the achievement of a common resolution 
difficult.  
The main aims of this thesis are to elucidate the satu  of cultural groups 
and of individuals, to found their relation to potential cultural rights and to 
provide a system that would guarantee the right place for cultural groups and their 
members in a debate concerning social justice. The perspective that guides this 
analysis relies on the individual as the justification for rights for cultural 
protection. However, this position is not meant to undermine the role of cultural 
groups in this realm, which make it possible to be conceptualised and affirmed. 
For this purpose, the notion of capabilities will be introduced. Capabilities will 
provide the correct criterion for the recognition of social inequalities given 
cultural differences and for according rights to individuals that lack them.  
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The individuals’ potential to realize their own ideals of life depends on the 
assets of the institutions they live in. A comparison between the notion of cultural 
groups and of social institutions will highlight the relevance that groups hold for 
actualizing the individual good of carrying on one’s life’s ideals. Cultural groups 
are the frameworks from which people can actualise the pursuit of their own ends. 
This is similar to institutions, which enable people to express and benefit from 
their own liberties and rights.131 Namely, cultural groups should not undermine 
the individuals’ necessary requirement of freedom t choose between any cultural 
affiliation that best suits with their values and ideals of a worthy life. In this 
respect, freedom of choice represents a pillar thatjustifies any reference to 
cultural groups as necessary institutional frameworks for the expression of one’s 
individuality and its recognition.  
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Capabilities for Cultural Groups 
 
The notion of capabilities represents one of the central elements for the 
acknowledgment of a disadvantage of minorities’ memb rs in multicultural 
societies. The attribution of capabilities refers specifically to those members of 
cultural groups in a minority who live in conditions of disadvantage in relation to 
the members of the majority. This disadvantage regards issues of equality of 
opportunities, recognition and participation in the public political discourse, and 
freedom of affiliation. Although the theory of capabilities that will be considered 
in the following discussion refers specifically to issues of equality in multicultural 
states, it aims at a universal application where issue  of disadvantage due to 
cultural membership occur.132 
The concept of capabilities that will be supported in the following 
arguments is derived from Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. Nussbaum develops 
her theory of capabilities in line with the same con ept of capabilities proposed by 
Amartya Sen.133 However, these two theories diverge on several points: 
Nussbaum’s main aim is to give a philosophical ground ‘for an account of basic 
constitutional principles that should be respected and implemented by the 
governments of all nations, as a bare minimum of what respect for human dignity 
requires’.134 Sen’s alternate account of the capabilities approach provides a 
principle for the economic understanding of the disa vantages of worse-off people 
on a global level. It takes into account not only quantitative measurements, such 
as GDP, but also the criteria of quality of life and of opportunities for 
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redistribution of resources.135 Hence, Nussbaum’s account supplies a more 
theoretical and philosophical perspective than Sen’s, which instead supports its 
application as a tool for the conceptualisation of specific policies for people in 
need and for the creation of a universally accepted rinciple of development.136 
 
3.1. Why Capabilities? 
The definition of capabilities that Nussbaum delivers intends for human 
capabilities to be perceived in terms of ‘[…] what people are actually able to do 
and to be […]’.137 In contrast, herein a further specification will be added to this 
definition, which will be valid both for individuals and for groups. In order to 
clarify this additional point to the definition prop sed by Nussbaum, capabilities 
have to be intended as those criteria that determin what people should be able to 
do and to be, in reference to their cultural membership. This last point is 
extremely important to understand the range of originality that the concept of 
capabilities holds in the current discussion. In fact, capabilities will be used as a 
criterion for the acknowledgment of a disadvantage in the social realm due to the 
scarcity of opportunities of participation in any public, political decision. The 
disadvantage that members of minority cultures have to face in relation to equality 
in opportunities, recognition and participation in the public discourse, and 
freedom of affiliation has been analysed in the previous chapters. The 
implications of this disadvantage have been stressed in relation to the individuals’ 
fundamental ability of articulating meaningful choices. This chapter will move on 
to present a solution to rebalance this disadvantage. This task has been addressed 
toward the application of a notion of capabilities aimed at the equalisation of the 
social status of the majority and of minorities.  
The reason to consider the notion of capabilities and pply it to the debate 
on rights of cultural membership is that it alleviates the insufficiencies 
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perpetuated by the current debate on the subject. The present positions focus 
primarily on cultural rights for individuals and collectivities. However, as 
previously demonstrated, the justification of collective rights for cultural 
protection cannot be properly held. Having shed light on the misleading notion of 
collective rights presented by the current debate, it is clearly urgent for the sake of 
social equality to find a solution for problems made evident by the lack of 
opportunities in the political and institutional participation and in the consequent 
application of a conception of the good. The loss of these three elements can be 
translated in the loss of capabilities of practical reason and affiliation that 
members of specific minority cultural groups have to cope with.138 Thus, 
capabilities seem to address those points that the notion of collective rights 
erroneously deals with. The following analysis will therefore be supported 
through the acknowledgment of the contributory role that capabilities play in the 
protection of culture and cultural membership. 
 
3.2. A New Account of Capabilities. 
Nussbaum defines capabilities as those categories that let primary needs be 
conceptualised as fundamental for each and every human being. Her account of 
capabilities is in line with a theory of human rights, which stresses the most 
necessary elements for a decent human life. However, capabilities differ from 
rights as they do not have any legal connotation; rather they are conceived by 
Nussbaum as those indicators that must be respected through legal protection 
(including rights). Therefore, Nussbaum’s account of capabilities refers to an 
individualistic perspective that provides equal opprtunities to all people, in 
relation to a conception of the good that tackles the minimum requirements for a 
decent life. Nussbaum sets up her account of capabilities in the context of the 
liberal state, in which any view of the good is prefe red to any other. Capabilities 
are therefore those minimum requirements that every human being has reason to 
want to be preserved in his life. This definition of capabilities, as Nussbaum 
admits, is close to Rawls’s list of primary goods. 
                                                





‘We can see the list of capabilities as like a long list of 
opportunities for functioning, such that it is always rational to 
want them whatever else one wants’.139 
 
In the notion of capabilities for cultural groups tha  is endorsed in this 
thesis, capabilities will assume a slightly different meaning than that proposed by 
Nussbaum. This new account of capabilities will be subject to deal with the 
articulation of a disadvantage that is common to memb rs because of a common 
cultural membership. Therefore, capabilities for cultural groups are intended for 
groups as they meet the needs of individuals as the members of a particular group. 
In this sense capabilities aim at the restoration of a disadvantage that exists 
because it refers to the articulation of different conceptions of the good. 
Capabilities for groups refer to the guarantee of the same opportunities for those 
people who engage in different ideals of a good life than those of the majority of 
the state. Therefore, this account of capabilities can only be applied to the concept 
of multicultural states composed by differentiated groups whose conceptions of 
the good are sometimes at odds with the majority.  
The perspective guiding the present theory of capabilities will touch upon 
a supplementary case in the articulation of the approach adopted by Nussbaum in 
her work. In Frontiers of Justice, Nussbaum declares her aim to expand the 
Rawlsian theory of justice toward three specific cases that it seems to neglect, but 
that nevertheless represent important aspects to consider for a complete account of 
social justice.140 These three cases include justice for disabled people, justice 
across national frontiers and justice for non-human animals.141 Nussbaum’s 
capabilities approach deals specifically with the acknowledgment of a set of 
capabilities aimed at restoring equality against all discriminations due to gender, 
cultural affiliation and area of living. Her work bears no trace of capabilities for 
cultural groups. To enrich Nussbaum’s theory of capabilities and to provide a new 
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application of capabilities for cultural groups and members, a systematic 
examination of the theory of capabilities toward its application for cultural groups 
will be provided. The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate that the use of the 
notion of capabilities, intended as a criterion forunderstanding and operating 
toward equality and against cultural non-recognitio and disadvantage, is 
extremely fruitful for a resolution on the topic ofsocial justice in multicultural 
contexts.  
At this stage, it is important to underline that the criterion of capabilities 
may be pushed toward the assessment of a disadvantage ot only of members of 
cultural groups, but of cultural groups themselves. Far from affirming the 
metaphysical existence of cultural groups as independent from their members, the 
aim of this text is to supply a criterion that guarantees the legitimacy of individual 
cultural rights in the realm of multiculturalism. The notion of capabilities for 
groups plays an important role in representing a channel through which individual 
capabilities may be expressed at the social level and the attribution of cultural 
rights may be acknowledged in relation to social disa vantages. Therefore, it is 
vital to underline that group’s capabilities, in this sense, are tightly connected and 
dependent on the members that will enjoy the content of the rights conceived for 
restoring the capabilities they lack. In particular, the focus will rest on those 
capabilities that Nussbaum names practical reason and affiliation, which refer to 
the ability of people both to have the opportunities to conceptualise and actualise 
their life plans, and to undertake social relations. Although the protection of these 
two forms of capabilities are intended as the protection of the corresponding 
abilities and opportunities for individuals, Nussbaum underlines the capability of 
affiliation (point A) by stating that ‘protecting this capability means protecting 
institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation […]’.142  
Capabilities of groups therefore must not be intended as detached from 
individuals, but only as a criterion for the acknowledgment of a disadvantage that 
is shared among the members of a cultural group. The achievement of these 
capabilities is always linked to the individuals that compose the group and not to 
                                                





the group itself. In support of this statement, the capabilities approach rejects the 
system of the utilitarian account of equality. In contrast, the perspective guiding 
capabilities claims an approach that sees each individual as an end in himself.143 
Two notions of group’s capabilities must therefore b differentiated. This 
distinction separates groups intended as independent entities and groups as places 
of affiliation and association dependent on members. 
The argument for the rejection of capabilities for groups, as bearers of 
rights, argues that conceiving of groups as metaphysical entities affirms that they 
deserve special consideration and protection independent of the individuals. 
Therefore, focusing on capabilities for groups would require adopting a utilitarian 
perspective, as the implicit aim behind this view would be to reach the 
maximisation of capabilities for the members, rather than for each member 
intended as an end in himself. The critique of utilitarianism that Nussbaum 
endorses in her works guarantees the worth of each individual, conceived as an 
entity deserving the same amount of basic capabilities as any other human 
being.144 Conversely, utilitarianism pursues the maximisation of capabilities in a 
society and consequently does not guarantee equal opportunities of ‘functioning’ 
to all individuals.145 Relying on Nussbaum’s critique of utilitarianism sets up the 
grounds for the rejection of capabilities for groups as entities detached from 
individuals. In fact, the utilitarian perspective would require aiming at the 
maximisation of capabilities for certain individuals of the group and not for 
others.  
 
3.3. The Concept of Relationality for Cultural Groups. 
In light of the previous distinction, the notion of capabilities for groups may be 
accepted only in particular circumstances, i.e. only if the notion of cultural groups 
play a specific and unique role in the social realm. This is similar to the role of 
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social institutions, which play mediating role betwen the state and the citizens.146 
This position emphasises the social embedment of cultural groups, conceived as 
those spaces where capabilities may be applied to the individuals of a particular 
group deserving special public recognition and legal support. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, it is possible to compare the two notions of political and social 
institutions, and cultural groups by stressing the similar role that they play in the 
social sphere. If on the one hand institutions enable people’s rights and liberties to 
be realised, on the other hand cultural groups enabl  meaningful choices to be 
made and cultural membership to be expressed. In view of the discussion 
proposed in the previous chapter, both liberties and cultural membership can be 
said to represent individual primary goods. Therefore, the role of institutions and 
cultural groups may be said to be similar, as they represent those channels that 
enable these primary goods to be enjoyed.  
The social embedment of cultural groups is therefore an important aspect 
to be borne in mind, in relation with the notion of autonomy of groups. Several 
claims raised from cultural minorities argue for autonomy in relation to the central 
government, which according to these claims fails in representing them. Legal 
actions have been introduced in these cases: for example, the right to self-
determination for indigenous people, which was ratified by the UN Declaration of 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Article 3, represents one of them.147 On a more 
theoretical level, the notion of autonomy for groups as the basis of the rights that 
cultural minorities have reason to enjoy has strongly been defended by Kymlicka. 
His position argues for the need of self-determination and autonomy of cultural 
groups in the context of multicultural states. These necessary conditions aim to 
enable people to plan their lives according to their b liefs and values.148 
                                                
146 Honneth, Justice as Institutionalized Freedom, p. 179. 
147 UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous People, March 2008, p. 4.  The full copy of the UN 
Declaration is available on the website: 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf 
148 Fiona MacDonald underlines that Kymlicka’s account on minority rights stresses the 
congruence between individual’s autonomy and group’s autonomy [MacDonald, Relational Group 
Autonomy: Ethics of Care and the Multicultural Paradigm (Hypatia, Vol. 25, no. 1, Winter 2010), 
p. 197]. She affirms that ‘Kymlicka situates cultural group autonomy as the central principle for 





Arguments for autonomy and self-determination may nevertheless acquire a 
detrimental side, if they continue to neglect the value of social embedment that 
comes within citizenship in a state. Autonomy and self-determination, in certain 
cases, lead to the consequence of excluding some groups of people from the 
public realm in the name of cultural membership. For example, indigenous people 
have sometimes had to pay the price of being cut off fr m the opportunities that 
are open to the majority for following autonomous and original cultural practices, 
such as different language, habits, education, etc. This situation may sometimes 
result in an outcome opposed to the aim of the politics of multiculturalism, whose 
goal is to assure cultural groups’ autonomy. Policies that do not account for the 
connection between cultural groups and the government of the state inevitably end 
up neglecting people’s diversities and needs, and de ying opportunities for people 
to enjoy their rights of exit from groups. According to Fiona MacDonald, the best 
way to promote respect and active recognition of cultural differences is to adopt a 
philosophy of care that takes into account the elemnt of autonomy in 
relationality.149 In her view: 
 
‘if the continued power and influence of the state is not recognized 
and included in our understanding of group autonomy, then national 
groups like Canada’s indigenous people face new forms of exclusion 
and inequality. […] Due to these significant restrictions, it is a 
dangerous mischaracterisation to suggest that these groups are 
“autonomous” as they are prevented from exercising important 
practices of democratic agency’.150  
 
MacDonald’s account of relationality refers to a ‘relational conception of 
group autonomy’,151 which means that groups should not be seen as entirely 
detached from their embedment in the social realm, but rather as parts of a higher 
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whole that is represented by the society. In this context, relationality can represent 
a tool for maintaining the character of autonomy of groups along with the 
necessity to relate with the world ‘outside’ the group. MacDonald’s perspective is 
particularly relevant in this context because it founds the possibility of cultural 
groups as institutional assets, possible because of their deep embedment in the 
social realm. Furthermore, it makes the important point of keeping the unity of the 
state, which sometimes is overlooked by the advocates of multiculturalism. 
Further, relationality is central for granting the right of exit that members have 
reason to enjoy at any moment. To guarantee the devlopment of those individual 
capabilities, whose absence would impede any member to voluntary leave the 
group, it is essential to bear in mind the conception of the social embedment of 
cultural groups within the nation. The capabilities n question are, for example, 
the knowledge of the official language of the state, the understanding of the 
bureaucratic and legal systems, the inclusion in education and health programs, 
and so forth, which refer to Nussbaum’s capabilities of practical reason, 
affiliation and control over one’s environment (point A: Political).152 
The concept of relationality is also extremely important to understanding the 
arguments for the position of cultural groups at the same level of social 
institutions. In fact, relationality presupposes that people live in a social context 
from which they cannot be separated without suffering from significant 
disadvantages in relation to the other citizens of the state. As institutions represent 
those channels through which people can accede to their rights and opportunities 
guaranteed by the state, cultural groups also constitute those mediums through 
which people can exercise their primary good of cultura  membership. In both 
cases, the concept relationality helps to understand that although the primary good 
of cultural membership is an individual good, it is al o embedded in a relational 
context with the other members that compose the cultural group, just as rights and 
opportunities are embedded in the society in which they are instituted.  
 
 
                                                





3.4. Rights and Goods. 
A further distinction between rights and good must be made in order to ground the 
utility of the concept of capabilities for cultural groups. Individuals’ rights of 
cultural preservation (or cultural membership) are supported by institutions, which 
represent the medium through which the government ca  adequately deliver its 
legislations and through which the citizens can effectively benefit from their 
rights.153 Therefore, the constitutive place in which rights can be enjoyed by 
individuals is represented by governmental institutions, either formal or informal. 
In contrast, the protection of the ideals of the good does not find any specific 
place in the liberal state, as no conception of the good must be preferred on others. 
Therefore, no institutions are intended to contribue to the achievement of any 
conception of any ideal of a good life that is different form the majority one, 
which nevertheless is more or less explicitly implied in the institutions of a 
country.  
The notion of the good seems therefore not to acquire any importance in 
the liberal public realm, as it refers to the private sphere of a human being. In the 
liberal theory, the role of the state is restricted o provide equal opportunities for 
each and every citizen to engage in the conceptualisation and actualisation of his 
own ideal of good. These opportunities are protected through the notion of rights, 
which in turn are defined for the individual enjoyment.  
However, inequalities due to cultural membership are specifically caused 
by the inability of members of minority cultures to follow their conception of the 
good in the public realm. In this case, the notion of good acquires fundamental 
relevance, as it represents the main element involved in the assessment of the 
social disadvantage of cultural minorities. Hence, it seems that the reference to 
political institutions, as places where people can enjoy their rights, is not 
sufficient to tackle the problem of those inequalities that refer to the management 
of the notion of good. In fact, what it is at stake in this context is not the right of 
people to have and enjoy their cultural membership, but rather the real possibility 
of people to enjoy this right in a context not limited to political institutions, which 
                                                





do not protect any particular conception of the good. The notion of right does not 
incorporate the inequality that may arise from the opportunities to follow original 
shared conceptions of the good, such as those provided by the membership in 
minority’s cultural groups. The reference to the common good of members of 
minority cultures acquires specific importance as it is the source that allows 
people to understand the inequalities that exist in pursuing a conception of the 
good that is different from the majority culture’s conception.  
This imbalance between the real possibilities that people of a majority 
culture and people of minority cultures have in pursuing their different 
conceptions of the good generates a deeper inequality in the public realm. It can 
be translated in the language of capabilities as the loss of the two capabilities of 
practical reason and affiliation (point A).154 It therefore seems urgent to appeal to 
a concept of capabilities for the protection of those ideals of good that are not 
conceived in the notion of right but that raise a great deal of questions of social 
justice in multicultural contexts. In particular, capabilities have to be intended not 
only for individuals, who are the focal point of the current discussion about social 
justice, but also for cultural groups, which are thplace where the members can 
enjoy their capabilities of practical reason and affili tion. 
A concrete example may be useful to understand this point. Suppose that 
the political institution of marriage is not established in the state X. X is internally 
composed of a majority culture, which does not believ  in the good of the 
institution of marriage, and of a minority group Y, whose members instead deeply 
believe in the institution of marriage. The conception of good that Y’s members 
have is therefore connected to the possibility of each member to marry. However, 
no particular conception of the good is allowed privileged status in the context of 
X: therefore, Y’s members cannot get legitimately married, because th  
legalisation of marriage in this case would require th  adoption of a partial view 
that benefits some citizens at the expense of others. This behaviour creates a 
disadvantage for the members of Y, as they would not be able to achieve their 
valued conception of the good in this case via the practice of marriage. This 
                                                





example illustrates that different conceptions of the good involve inequalities 
among individuals that are fundamental in any discourse on social justice, and that 
they should not be overlooked by the liberal theory of the state.  
 
3.5. Justifying Capabilities for Cultural Groups. 
It is now time to turn to the possibility of applying the concept of capabilities to 
cultural groups. In her theory of capabilities, Nussbaum sporadically refers to the 
social system of institutions, in reference to the notion of capabilities for human 
beings. In her view, institutions should work in relation to the promotion of a 
minimum threshold of capabilities for individuals.155 Therefore, the institutional 
system should be oriented toward the just outcomes conceived in terms of 
capabilities. In this task, institutions represent an important element for the 
delivering of capabilities for each and every human being.156  
It is possible to draw a comparison between Rawls’s theory of institutions 
and Nussbaum’s system of institutions. Rawls intends i stitutions both as abstract 
rules of conduct for individuals and as ‘the realiztion in the thought and conduct 
of certain persons at a certain time and place of the actions specified by these 
rules’.157 Likewise, Nussbaum conceives institutions both as an overall system 
that gives behavioural principles for the achievement of a minimum level of 
human dignity and as the actualisation of these ruls in the capabilities of every 
individual. Both in Rawls’s and Nussbaum’s terms, an institutional system is just 
only if it both respects the requirements of justice at an abstract level and enables 
the internalisation and expression of institutional rules in individual practices.158 
A difference can be identified in these two accounts: Rawls adopts a procedural 
account of justice (which sees institutions as the system to organise in order to 
achieve justice), whereas Nussbaum undertakes an outcome-orientated 
perspective (which first sees the outcomes and tries o arrange institutions for the 
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achievement of a just outcome).159 In spite of this divergence, justice for Rawls 
and Nussbaum is achieved when each individual is inthe condition of benefiting 
from equal opportunities (in Rawls’s terms) or capabilities (in Nussbaum’s terms), 
which is possible when adequate institutions are set for this purpose. However, 
there are cases in which the only reference to individuals’ opportunities or 
capabilities is not sufficient for guaranteeing thefunctioning of the opportunities 
that have been equally distributed among citizens. This is the case, for example, of 
justice in multicultural contexts: although every citizen is covered by the same 
rights and duties, other kinds of disadvantage remain to be addressed according to 
the particular requirements of some individuals or groups in distress.160 Therefore, 
it seems that, in this circumstance, the only reference to opportunities or 
capabilities for individuals is not sufficient to determine and accord the rights that 
individuals have in relation to their cultural membership.  
The focus on individuals in multicultural states is precisely the problem that 
capabilities for groups aim to address. Attributing capabilities to groups helps 
clarify the disadvantage that members of the same cultural groups have in relation 
to the rights of political participation, decision-making and life-planning 
processes. Enabling the capability approach regarding cultural groups bypasses 
the attribution of rights to cultural groups in orde  to alleviate the disadvantage of 
cultural minorities in the social and political realm. The adoption of an account of 
capabilities for cultural groups is beneficial for two reasons: first, it does not 
foster the attribution of rights to groups. Second, it furnishes a solution for those 
disadvantages that cannot be addressed through rights, because they refer to those 
situations that individual rights fail to address. Specifically, these situations refer 
to the disadvantages in public decision-making processes and in the ability to 
bring forth conceptions of the good divergent to the majority. Capabilities stress 
the importance that cultural groups have in their role of institutions, i.e. the place 
where the primary good of cultural membership can be expressed and pursued. 
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This is because cultural groups synthesise the capabilities that members lack as a 
result of their cultural membership. 
 
‘[…] The capabilities are sought for each and every person, ot, in 
the first instance, for groups or families or states or other corporate 
bodies. Such bodies may be extremely important in promoting 
human capabilities, and in this way they may deservedly gain our 
support: but it is because of what they do for peopl  that they are so 
worthy, and the ultimate political goal is always the promotion of 
the capabilities of each person’.161  
 
From this grounding of Nussbaum’s theory of capabilities for individuals, 
we can extend analysis to capabilities for groups. Whenever capabilities for 
individuals lack (as in the case of members of minority cultures), then there is an 
urgent need to repair the loss that is created by this disadvantage. However, the 
awareness of this loss and the justification for the attribution of rights for the 
protection of those people that are in distress sometimes needs to be reconceived, 
because the disadvantage is often not recognised as important in the social realm, 
as it addresses to the notion of good.  
The acknowledgment of disadvantages due to cultural affiliation must 
therefore proceed from the individuals to the society, and the corresponding 
solutions must proceed from the society to the individuals. An intermediate 
functional element is therefore needed in order to accomplish the task of stressing 
the lack of capabilities and to accord the necessary c pabilities to the individuals 
that need them. This is the role both of institutions and of cultural groups. Cultural 
groups represent those channels through which individual rights of cultural 
protection are acknowledged and met. 
As analysed in the previous chapter, individuals are entitled to the right to 
see their culture preserved, which can only be justified at the individual level.162 
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Assuming collective rights of cultural preservation would require elevating 
cultural groups to metaphysical entities, which have the right to hold actions 
against the well-being of their members for the sake of the preservation of the 
group. The right that individuals would have in this context would be untouchable 
and unquestionable. Therefore, positing an individual right to cultural 
preservation requires positing a duty of someone to meet the requirements of this 
right. In other words, there must be an agent that takes action for the protection of 
the right that each human being has to preserve his cultural membership. As 
argued in the previous chapter, this duty must be held by the government of the 
state, which has the duty to answer with the appropriate ‘tools’ for the protection 
of the individual positive right to cultural membership.163 In this context, the more 
successful ‘tools’ for the protection of this right refer to the maintenance of the 
environment in which cultural membership can be expr ssed, i.e. the preservation 
of the cultural group their membership is linked to. The translation of the 
individual right for the protection of their culture at a collective level does not 
result in the legal attribution of a right for groups, but rather in assuring that the 
correct capabilities for the given cultural context to exist and to preserve the place 
where members can enjoy their right of cultural memb rship.  
The capabilities at stake in this context refer only to two of the categories 
that Nussbaum acknowledges: practical reason and affiliation.164 These 
capabilities play an important role in the circumstance considered, i.e. in 
multicultural societies. In fact, although the ten categories of capabilities proposed 
by Nussbaum refer specifically to individuals, only these two can be upheld in 
reference to the collective dimension of cultural groups. Quoting Nussbaum: 
 
‘Among the capabilities, two, practical reason and affiliation, stand 
out as of special importance, since they both organize and suffuse 
all the others, making their pursuit truly human. […] To plan for 
one’s life without being able to do so in complex forms of 
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discourse, concern, and reciprocity with other human beings is, 
again, to behave in an incompletely human way’.165  
 
In short, the extension of the concept of capabilities from their individual 
source to the collective dimension refers to the fact that capabilities represent the 
best notion for the protection of the ideals of a good life that are not conceived in 
the language of rights. Capabilities for groups, in this sense, are intended as those 
features that deliver claims for the loss of fundamental capabilities for members in 
relation to their common cultural membership (and therefore in relation to their 
common conception of the good). In this respect, applying the notion of 
capabilities to groups enables the understanding of the common disadvantage that 
individuals face in relation to their cultural membership and addresses the 
problem at a social level through the institutional character acquired by groups. 
An examination of the application of the two categories of capabilities of practical 
reason and affiliation for cultural groups will foll w, along with an assessment of 
the benefits that it produces. 
 
3.5.1. The Capability of Practical Reason for Cultural Groups. 
 
‘Practical Reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and 
to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s life. (This 
entails protection for the liberty of conscience)’.166 
 
The capability of practical reason defined by Nussbaum refers to the need of 
people to freely plan their lives by following the conception of the good they hold 
to be the best according to their values and beliefs. This category of capability is 
therefore very close to the content of the right to cultural membership, which has 
been accounted as primary good. Thus, the capability of practical reason protects 
people’s liberty to articulate their lives in relation to the goods they believe in, 
which may be supported by a specific cultural group. 
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If the capability of practical reason refers to indivi uals’ rights of cultural 
membership, it remains to be demonstrated how capabilities may be applied at the 
collective level. To illustrate this point, it must be borne in mind once again that 
capabilities for groups can only be understood in relation to capabilities for their 
members.  
Applying the notion of capability for practical reason to cultural groups 
affirms that cultural groups should enjoy the capability to ‘form a conception of 
the good’ and ‘engage in a critical reflection about the planning of one’s life’.167 
In order to understand how these two sentences may be linked to the notion of 
cultural groups, it is important to stress that the current analysis is applicable in 
the context of multicultural states, in which members of minorities lack 
fundamental capabilities, specifically those of practical reason and affiliation.  
If members of a minority cultural group are not able to enjoy the capability 
of practical reason, it means that none of them are abl  to enjoy their right to 
make meaningful choices. The difficulty in ensuring this capability for each and 
every member in their individuality can be addressed by widening the concept of 
the claimant to the group, who will be responsible for its delivery in the social 
sphere. In fact, if lack of capability of practical reason for the members of a 
minority group is brought forth by the minority group itself as a claim against the 
majority, then its resonance is strengthened. This process uniquely enables the 
minority group to expose solutions to restore the capability for each member.  
Capabilities for groups, in this sense, are the tool that makes the acknowledgment 
of a disadvantage that touches the members of the group possible. However, at the 
social level, affirming that it is the group that lcks of capabilities may help to 
recognise members’ claims in a public and higher level, instead of in a private and 
secondary sphere.  
Therefore, saying that in certain cases minority cultural groups lack the 
capability of practical reason means that their memb rs lack this capability 
because of their membership in the group. Thus, their inability to form a 
conception of the good or to engage in a critical reflection about the planning of 
                                                





one’s life affects the survival of the group, which in turn affects the existence of 
the context in which members are able to make meaningful choices for their lives. 
In order to clarify this concept, a hypothetical example will be analysed. 
Suppose that Q is a minority cultural group, whose members have a strong belief 
in their god. Suppose also that the majority culture P in which Q’s members live 
bans any credo; instead P’s members think that religion is only a human 
construction and that the belief in god has no realvalue. It is obvious that Q’s 
members suffer from a disadvantage, as they cannot make use of any institution to 
express their religion. Therefore, their conception of the good (in relation to the 
spiritual part of their selves) cannot be expressed an  causes a loss in their 
capability of practical reason. According capabilities to Q enables the reparation 
of the disadvantage held by Q’s members. This is because this disadvantage is 
caused by the common membership to Q, which in turn represents the necessary 
environment in which the reparation of this deficiency can occur. Attributing 
capabilities to Q would also provide a place for Q’s members to enjoy their credo 
and express their conception of the good. In fact, given that the two notions of 
cultural groups and institutions are comparable and that the utilitarian perspective 
is rejected, the attribution of capabilities to groups will not degenerate in the 
conception of groups as entities detached from their m mbers.  
Capabilities for groups are therefore aimed toward two goals: first, the 
delivery of individual claims into the public sphere (this is the role of groups as 
institutions and it refers to the claims of justice as recognition); second, the 
protection of the context in which individuals can make meaningful choices and 
therefore enjoy their capability of practical reason.  
Furthermore, stating that cultural groups are entitl d o hold capabilities 
avoids attributing rights to groups, the attribution f which would imply a 
submission of the individuals for the sake of the group. In opposition, capabilities 
for groups are aimed at the well-being of members: they represent those channels 
that enable members to enjoy their capability of practical reason. Capabilities for 
groups are therefore a sort of guarantee for the acknowledgment of capabilities for 





of all its members, does not benefit from the capability of practical reason, it 
cannot be said that a threshold level of capabilities has been reached for its 
members.  
 
3.5.2. The Capability of Affiliation for Cultural Groups. 
 
‘Affiliation.  A. Being able to live with and toward others, […], to 
engage in various forms of social interaction […]. (Protecting this 
capability means protecting institutions that constitute and nourish 
such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the fr edom of 
assembly and political speech)’.168  
 
At this point, it is easier to understand the reason why the capability of affiliation 
(point A) addresses cultural groups as well as indiv duals. Cultural groups (as a 
union of members) represent those places where cultural affiliation is possible.  
According to Raz, some collective social forms (in which the notion of 
culture can be included) require the existence of social institutions for their 
realisation.169 The very possibility of protecting the capability of affiliation for 
members is connected to the protection of those places where people can express 
their capability to live in harmony with others and to ‘engage in various forms of 
social interactions’.170 
Protecting capabilities of practical reason and affili tion for groups 
constitutes a necessary element for the individual’s expression of other 
capabilities. This position adheres to Nussbaum’s conception of capability of 
affiliation: in point A, Nussbaum underlines the need of protecting the 
institutional structure that leads these capabilities to be realised.171 The 
institutional structure in question is represented by cultural groups, which 
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constitute the institutions that link those citizens that are members of a cultural 
group and the state.  
Once again, capabilities represent the channels throug  which disadvantage 
can be recognised and actions can take place for repairing this disadvantage. The 
content of action that capabilities deliver is a specific feature that Nussbaum 
particularly wants to underline in her account.  
 
‘[…] Thinking in terms of capability gives us a benchmark as we 
think about what it really is to secure a right to someone. It makes 
clear that to do this involves affirmative material and institutional 
support, not simply a failure to impede’.172 
 
The reference to action strengthens the role of capabilities as appropriate 
instruments for the delivery of the state’s duty to cultural protection that has 
previously been established through the examination of Fabre’s complementarity 
thesis. 
A reference to a concrete example that stresses the ben fits that capabilities 
for groups deliver can help to understand the extent of the improvements that the 
attribution of the notion of capabilities to cultural groups achieves.  
R is a minority cultural group, composed by numerous members and situated 
in the context of a wider and different culture, T. R’s members promote a set of 
values that differs from those of the majority culture. R’s members have to 
adequate the practice of their values by means of the institutions that are set for the 
promotion of T’s values. In concrete, imagine that R’s members have the practice 
of celebrating religious ceremonies (celebrations of aints or of funerals) through 
processions on streets and that this practice constitute  a pillar of their cultures. In 
contrast, T’s members do not act in such a way; in fact, they prefer private 
ceremonies and disregard public manifestations of their religious practices. In this 
context, T’s institutions do not assure the capability of R’s members to ‘affiliate’ 
with each other in the occasion of religious celebrations. It is clear that R’s 
                                                





members are in disadvantage compared to T’s members, because they cannot rely 
on any recognised institution for the practice of the constitutive elements of their 
culture. However, R’s members should enjoy their right of cultural membership 
and of all the values that are connected to it, which include the public celebrations 
of festivities and commemorations. This act does not cause any harm to anyone and 
they do not oblige other people to follow their practice, if not wished. Therefore, it 
is urgent to provide a place where R’s members can enjoy public ceremonies, or 
their capability of affiliation would not be respect d.  
In this situation, according capability to R would help to acknowledge the 
need of R’s members to engage in the practice of public manifestations and it 
would also recognize the institutional status of R, which would constitute the legal 
place in which R’s members enjoy their valuable practices. According the 
capability of affiliation to R means enabling R to be the place in which its members 
can affiliate and perpetuate the practices that constitute their objects of meaningful 
choice.  
Hence, thinking in terms of capabilities avoids thinking in terms of rights and 
enables the identification of the correct place androle that cultural groups have in 
relation to their members. In this context, the language of capabilities turns out to 
be more advantageous than the language of rights. Several points will be discussed 
in this regard. 
 
3.6. Capabilities and Rights. 
The discussion over the rejection of rights for cultural groups touches upon the 
inconsistency of the conception of groups as metaphysical entities. However, 
attributing the notion of capabilities to cultural groups does not allocate rights for 
cultural groups. It is important to keep the notions of rights and capabilities 
separate. Although capabilities are aimed at the recognition of a loss of basic 
elements of human life, they are different from rights. It is important to stress that 
capabilities do not have any legal connotation; they only represent a category 





The advantage of thinking in terms of capabilities rather than rights is that 
capabilities are more useful to truly understand anct toward the reparation of 
disadvantages. The focus on outcomes in the notion of capabilities helps to 
identify the problem and to stress its urgency, but it does not in anyway involve 
any legal implication. In this way, the link to rights for cultural groups is avoided, 
which instead refer to individuals.  
Capabilities provide a further element that is not offered by the right 
oriented perspectives. The advantage of endorsing an account that acknowledges 
capabilities for cultural groups is that capabilities focus on the real content of the 
claims advanced by minorities’ members and help to conceptualise responses ad 
hoc for every situation. In contrast, rights for minorities tend to generalise the 
solution that singular and specific claims bring forward, by proposing the same 
category of rights for all of them.  
It is on this point that the notion of capability plays its complementary role 
to rights. Capabilities, in this sense, are designed to conceptualise and repair a 
disadvantage that is caused by the adoption of different conceptions of the good 
that go beyond the attribution of equal rights for citizens. Given that rights are not 
conceived to protect any particular conception of the good, capabilities correct 
this shortcoming. Specifically, they protect those i sues that require the adoption 
of a conception of a good, which cannot be assured by the notion of rights.  
In the name of the attribution of the notion of primary good to cultural 
membership, individuals have a right to see their culture preserved and their 
membership respected. Therefore, at the individual level, it seems that the notion 
of right correctly completes the need for individuals to enjoy their cultural 
membership. However, the notion of right of cultural membership is not sufficient 
for the equalisation of the opportunities held by citizens of a same country, but 
with different cultural memberships. This disadvantage has been stressed by 
Kymlicka’s and Green’s perspectives, which appeal to the notion of special rights 
for groups as a tool for the restoration of this inequality.173 
                                                
173 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, p. 189; Green, ‘Internal Minorities and their 





As established in the previous chapter, any reference of a collective 
dimension of cultural rights is doomed to fail. Any attempt to justify cultural 
rights for groups cannot be established, because it would open the possibility of 
requiring submission of the members to the will of the group. However, the notion 
of collective rights can successfully be replaced by the notion of capabilities for 
cultural groups, which deals with the assessment of th se inequalities due to 
divergent conceptions of the good.  
The notion of good can therefore be managed through the concept of 
capabilities, which instead of implying the direct onnection with collective 
rights, aims to repair a disadvantage in relation t the acknowledgment of 
different conceptions of the good undertaken by several cultural groups in the 
same state.  
The perspective that justifies the attribution of the notion of capabilities 
for groups should now appear clearer. Further, the improvements that capabilities 
can offer to solve problems of social injustice due to diverse cultural membership 
have been expounded. Herein, capabilities are conceived as a criterion that 
guarantees to members of cultural groups the possibility to enjoy their right to 
cultural membership and their basic capabilities, and to avoid the attribution of 
rights to cultural groups. Through the acknowledgment of this new perspective of 
capabilities for cultural groups, the proper place for individuals and for cultural 
groups is established. This position is beneficial in two senses: it guarantees both 
equal rights for members of cultural groups and equal capabilities of expressing 













The arguments exposed in these chapters intend to provide a solution to issues of 
social inequality due to cultural differences. The two notions of individual rights 
and collective capabilities aim to offer a conception that rightfully distinguishes 
between the needs of cultural members and of their cultural groups. Several 
arguments for the rejection of collective rights for cultural protection have been 
exposed, which touch on the inability of groups to hold any metaphysical position 
that could damage the sphere of individuals. In contrast, the notion of capability 
has been identified as the proper solution for the acknowledgment of a 
disadvantage that members of the same group have to deal with. This 
disadvantage can also be conceived as an inability tha  the whole community has 
to face because of a common cultural membership. Capabilities for cultural 
groups are therefore useful for the conceptualisation of a shortcoming that is 
caused by the shared disadvantage of all the members of a minority group. In 
particular, the capabilities taken into account refe  to Nussbaum’s capabilities of 
practical reason and affiliation, which represent those categories that protect 
people’s ability to articulate a conception of the good life, embedded in a shared 
sense of commonality with the other members of the group.  
Furthermore, the notion of capabilities for groups avoids the reference to 
any right-oriented discourse. The great advantage that a theory of capabilities for 
cultural groups achieves is the creation of an account that does not presuppose the 
categorisation of cultural groups as independent entiti s, protected from legal 
connotations, but rather as instruments for the acknowledgment of an inequality 
due to the common cultural membership to a cultural minority. Additionally, an 
account of capabilities for cultural groups succeeds in providing a consistent and 
original contribution that overcomes the disagreements in the past debate over 
social justice in multicultural states. The conclusion of this thesis stresses that 
these disagreements can be avoided by introducing a new account of capabilities 
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